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Further Tests of Legislators Pay
ing to Deviate from Constituent
Interests
Noel D. Campbell*
University of Central Arkansas
Edward J. Lopez
San Jose State University
Tammy M. Rogers
University of Central Arkansas
Lopez and Campbell (2004) find a statistically significant, positive re
lationship between incumbents' deviations from their constituents' pre
ferences and incumbents subsequent campaign expenditures. We
replicate their empirical program using a different measure of incum
bent deviation based on Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998).
Using both measures of incumbents' deviations we both confirm and
disconfirm the Lopez and Campbell result, implying either the construct
of incumbents' deviations from constituents' interests or its operationa
lization is underdeveloped.
INTRODUCTION

opez and Campbell (2004) examine the empirical rela
tionship between vote score residuals and incumbents'
campaign expenditures in the subsequent re-election bid.
The incumbent's goal is to get re-elected. The literature on legis
lator voting has consistently shown that deviating from constitu
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ents' preferred policies makes this objective more difficult
(~ender and_ Lott, 1996). Despite this, an incumbent may occa
siOnally deviate from constituents' preferences with good reason
(to pursue personal views, to service interest group pressure, to
d~~on~trate loyalty to party leaders, etc.). To deviate while di
rrumsh_mg the costs of deviating, incumbents may increase their
campaign expenditures in an effort to convince constituents to
~ote for them regardless of their policy positions. This interpreta
tion of re-election expenditures has been termed "persuasive"
campaigning (Mueller and Stratmarm, 1994). If we view con
gressiOnal seat~ as _an economic good and re-election expendi
~ures as the urut pnce pmd by an incumbent for the good, then
I~cumbents may "buy" some deviation, in the form of dimi
rush~d el~ctoral punishment, by expending more in their re
e~ectwn bids: ~opez ~d. Campbell (2004) find a statistically sig
mfi~ant positive empmcal relationship between incumbents'
deviatiOns and their subsequent campaign expenditures for the
1992 throu?h 1998 Congressional elections, indicating persua
sive campaign expenditures.
However, to derive their measure of incumbent deviation
Lopez and Campbell rely on the widely used but still controver~
sial "residualization" procedure pioneered by Kau and Rubin
(1979). This paper seeks to replicate the empirical program of
~opez an~ Campbel~ witho~t recourse to the controversial empir
Ical tec!Ullq~e by usmg a different literature to derive a different
measure of mcumbent deviation. Berry, Ringquist, _Fording, and
Hanson (1998) present a framework for producing an alternative
me_asure on congresspersons' ideology based on interest group
ratm?s of congress~ersons (like the Kau and Rubin measure) and
electiOn results. Usmg ~method similar to that of Berry, et al.,
we produce an alternative measure of incumbents' deviations
from electorate wishes.
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Using our new measure of incumbents' deviation from con
stituents' interests, we replicate the Lopez and Campbell empiri
cal procedure. Contrary to the findings of Campbell and Lopez
(2004), we find that our measure of incumbent deviations is not
significantly related to incumbents' re-election expenditures.
However, we find that more incumbent deviation significantly
predicts lower vote margins for the incumbent and lower oppo
nent's expenditures in the incumbent's subsequent re-election
bid. Taken together, these findings imply that incumbent devia
tion does matter, as implied by Bender and Lott (1996). Further
more, the incumbent is not able to "buy back" some of his
deviation in a subsequent election bid. Rather, the electorate re
wards the challenger with higher voter support regardless of in
cumbent expenditure.
However, closer inspection of our results is not as injurious
to Lopez and Campbell (2004) as first inspection might indicate.
Despite the proposition that Lopez and Campbell's deviation
variable and our current deviation variable measure the same
phenomena, and despite the shared derivation of both meas
ures-adjusted ADA scores for incumbents-the two variables
have a low correlation coefficient of 0.049. Furthermore, models
applying both deviation variables both reconfirms the main Lo
pez and Campbell (2004) result and reconfirms this study's re
sult. These findings imply to us that either the construct of
incumbent deviations from constituent's purported interests, or
the operationalization of the construct, is underdeveloped.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section
two considers background theoretical issues, section three
presents the empirical results, while section four discusses and
concludes.
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